We present a theory of charitable fund-raising in which it is costly to solicit donors. We fully characterize the optimal solicitation strategy that maximizes donations net of fundraising costs. The optimal strategy dictates that the fund-raiser target only those individuals whose equilibrium contributions exceed their solicitation costs. We show that as the income inequality increases, so does the level of the public good, despite a non-monotonic fund-raising e¤ort. This implies that costly fund-raising can provide a novel explanation for the non-neutrality of income redistributions and government grants often found in empirical studies. We also show that in large economies, only the "most willing" donors are solicited; and the average donation converges to the solicitation cost of these donors, which is strictly positive.
Introduction
Charitable fund-raising 1 is a costly endeavor. Payne (2003, 2011) indicate that an average charity spends 5 to 25 percent of its donations on fund-raising activities, including direct mailing, telemarketing, face-to-face solicitations, and sta¢ ng. 2 For instance, every
We thank Silvana Krasteva and participants of Duke Theory lunch group for comments. All errors are ours. 1 Charitable sector is a signi…cant part of the U.S. economy. For instance, in 2008, total donations amounted to $307 billion. $229 billion of this total came from individuals, corresponding to 1.61% of GDP (Giving USA, 2009). See Andreoni (2006a) and List (2011) for an overview of this sector and the literature. 2 Various watchdog groups such as BBB Wise Giving Alliance and Charity Navigator regularly post these cost-to-donation percentages for thousands of charities in the U.S. They often recommend a benchmark of 30-35 percent for a well-run charity. year more than 115,000 nonpro…t organizations hire fund-raising sta¤ and consultants, paying them 2 billion dollars (Kelly, 1998 ). 3 It is thus strongly believed that both donors and charities dislike fund-raising, but view it to be a "necessary evil" for the greater good:
fund-raising diverts resources away from charitable services while informing, or otherwise persuading, donors of the cause and fund-drive. Despite its signi…cance, however, fundraising costs have not been fully incorporated into the theory of charitable giving. This is the gap we aim to …ll in this paper, and in doing so, we o¤er a new (and complementary) theory of charitable fund-raising.
Our formal setup adds an "active" fund-raiser to the "standard" model of giving in which donors care only about their private consumptions and the total supply of the public good. 4 In particular, unlike the standard model, we assume that each donor becomes aware of the charitable fund-drive only if solicited by the fund-raiser. 5 The solicitation is, however, costly. Our …rst observation is that the charity will contact an individual if he is expected to give more than his respective solicitation cost, or become a "net contributor"in equilibrium. We then show that identifying these net contributors in our model is equivalent to identifying the contributors in the standard model (without fund-raising cost) except that each donor's wealth is reduced by his solicitation cost. This important equivalence allows us to appeal to Andreoni and McGuire's (1993) elegant algorithm to solve for the latter. Our characterization of the optimal fund-raising strategy is simple because it does not require any equilibrium computation. More importantly, it pinpoints the exact set of donors to be targeted based on their preferences, incomes, and solicitation costs. 6 Using our characterization, we next address two policy-related issues, one about income redistribution and the other about government grants. When individuals di¤er only in their incomes, we show that the fund-raising strategy reduces to assigning each individual a cuto¤ cost of solicitation that depends on the incomes of others richer than him. Intuitively, with only the income heterogeneity, the charity considers contacting …rst the richest donor; and does not construct donors'responses from an equilibrium play. Andreoni and Payne (2003) endogenize both the fund-raiser and donors' responses as in our model, but they view solicitation letters to be randomly distributed. Their main theoretical result is that a government grant may discourage fund-raising, which is in line with one of our results.
Unlike them, we fully characterize the optimal strategy that involves targeted solicitations, and provide a richer set of results, regarding the non-neutrality and large economies.
In addition to the theoretical literature, there is a more extensive empirical and experimental literature on charitable giving, to which we will refer below. For recent surveys of the literature, see the reviews by Andreoni (2006a) and List (2011) .
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we set up the model.
In Section 3, we characterize donor equilibrium for an arbitrary set of solicitations. In Section 4, we determine the optimal fund-raising strategy as a modi…ed Andreoni and McGuire algorithm. In Sections 5 and 6, we consider the impacts of income redistribution and government grants, respectively. We examine large replica economies in Section 7, and conclude in Section 8. The proofs of all the formal results are relegated to the Appendix.
Model
Our formal setup extends the standard model of privately provided public goods (e.g., Warr 1983, Roberts 1984 , Bergstrom et al. 1986 , and Andreoni 1988) . Thus, it is useful to brie ‡y review this basic framework before introducing fund-raising costs.
Standard Model. There is a set of individuals, N = f1; :::; ng, who each allocate his wealth, w i > 0, between a private good consumption, x i 0, and a gift to the public good or charity, g i 0. Units are normalized so that x i + g i = w i . At the outset, every person is fully aware of the charitable fund-drive and thus in the "contribution game". Letting G = P i2N g i be the supply of the public good, individual i's preference is represented by the utility function u i (x i ; G), which is assumed to be strictly increasing, strictly quasi-concave, and twice di¤erentiable. Both public and private goods are normal. Thus, individual i's (Marshallian) demand function for the public good, denoted by f i (w), satis…es the strict normality: 0 < f 0 i (w) < 1 for all w > 0. The equilibrium gifts, fg 1 ; :::; g n g, are determined through a simultaneous play. Under strict normality, Bergstrom et al. (1986) showed that there is a unique Nash equilibrium.
To isolate any source of zero provision, we will assume that the standard model produces a positive level of the public good in equilibrium, G > 0. One su¢ cient condition for this is that f i (0) = 0 for all i 2 N , which we will maintain throughout. Together with strict normality, this condition implies that in a one-person economy, each individual allocates some positive amount of his wealth to the public good.
Costly Fund-raising. Note that there is no role for fund-raising in the standard model, as everyone is already aware of the fund-drive. 7 Thus, as with Rose-Ackerman (1982), and Andreoni and Payne (2003), we assume that each person i becomes informed of the fund-drive only if solicited by the fund-raiser. 8 It, however, costs c i > 0 to do so, 9 which may re ‡ect such expenses as telemarketing, direct mails, or door-to-door visits. While, for technical purposes (to break the indi¤erence), we do not allow for c i = 0, which could potentially represent repeat donors, one can always take the limits. 10 Let F N be an arbitrary set of donors who are contacted by the fund-raiser, or simply the fund-raiser set. In our basic model, we assume that each contacted donor is also informed of the entire set F ; 11 but we later show that even if the fund-raiser set is unobservable to donors, they can perfectly infer the "optimal" set in equilibrium. Let g i (F ) be donor i's equilibrium gift in the simultaneous play in F . Then, the total fund-raising cost and the gross level of donations are de…ned respectively by,
where C(?) = 0 and g i (?) = 0 by convention. Thus, the supply of the public good or charitable services is given by:
The charity's objective is to choose the set F that maximizes G (F ). Eq. (1) implies that if insu¢ cient funds are received to cover the cost, then no public good is provided, which 7 Alternatively, since, in the standard model, the equilibrium provision can never decrease by the inclusion of a new donor despite the free-rider problem (e.g., Andreoni and McGuire 1993), the fund-raiser would trivially ask everyone for donations. 8 Unlike Andreoni and Payne (2003), we assume for simplicity that each solicitation reaches the donor with certainty; or the fund-raiser ensures that this is the case. 9 Aside from its informational value, fund-raising may also prevent willing donors from procrastinating (O'Donoghue and Rabin 1999). As Andreoni (2006a, p. 1257) states, an iron law of fund-raising is that people tend not to give unless thay are asked. See Yoruk (2009) , and Meer and Rosen (2011) for some empirical evidence in favor of this so-called "the ask" principle.
1 0 We could also include a …xed setup cost of fund-raising; but its analysis would be similar to that of a (negative) government grant considered in Section 6. 1 1 For instance, the fund-raiser such as a private university may organize an alumni reunion at which contacted donors meet each other; or the fund-raiser may strictly instruct its volunteers to solicit donors from certain neighborhoods. simply refers to a failed fund-raising in our model. 12 We assume that the charity dislikes fund-raising in that when indi¤erent between two fund-raiser sets, it strictly prefers the one with the lower cost. 13 Our fund-raising game proceeds as follows. First, the charity decides whether or not to launch a fund-drive. If one is launched, then the charity reaches out to a (optimal) set F o of potential donors, which then becomes common knowledge among them. Finally, given the fund-raising cost of C(F o ), the contacted donors simultaneously contribute to the public good, leading to equilibrium gifts fg i (F o )g i2F o and the public good G (F o ). Our solution concept is subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.
Next, we brie ‡y explore the donors'behavior for an arbitrary subset of the population, and then consider the optimal fund-raiser set.
Donor Equilibrium
Suppose that an arbitrary subset F of population has been contacted for donations. Note that if fund-raising were costless, the contribution game in F would coincide with the standard model discussed above, and have a unique and positive level of public good in equilibrium, G (F ) > 0. The fund-raising cost, however, introduces a threshold to the provision of the public good (see eq. (1)) and the potential for a zero-contribution equilibrium.
To characterize the equilibrium contributions, consider …rst person i's solo decision to cover the entire fund-raising cost, C. Note that person i would receive utility u i (w i ; 0), if he contributed nothing. Otherwise, he would have to choose g i C to maximize u i (w i g i ; g i C). Let V i (w i C) be i's indirect utility in the latter case, which is increasing in the
we have V i (0) u i (w i ; 0). Hence, there is a unique cuto¤ cost, b C i 2 (0; w i ] such that when alone, person i would consume some public good if and only if C < b C i . 14 To highlight the collective nature of the fund-raising cost among contributors, we also make
1 2 For simplicity, it is assumed that donations are not refunded in the case of a failed fundraising, or they are used for other causes that donors do not care about. 1 3 One justi…cation for this could be that the charity has some concern about its cost/donation rating by the watchdog groups. Formally, if F 0 6 = F are two fundraiser sets such that G 0 C 0 = G C and C 0 > C, then it follows that C 0 =G 0 > C=G. This assumption is stronger than we need for our results, but it is easier to interpret. 15 It indicates that in a one-person economy, each donor would always prefer to cover his solicitation cost and consume some public good than consume only the private good. Nevertheless, the following result shows that donors together may contribute nothing.
Proposition 1.
Fix an arbitrary fund-raiser set, F 6 = ?, whose fund-raising cost is C(F ).
then there is always zero-contribution equilibrium, generating G (F ) = 0.
Proposition 1 simply says that if at least one person can bear the entire fund-raising cost alone, then the equilibrium provision of the public good is positive. However, if no person can bear the cost alone, then the zero-contribution pro…le becomes an equilibrium despite our Assumption S. This is because absent an explicit cost-sharing agreement, each donor cares about the total fund-raising cost, P i2F c i , at the time of giving -not just his own cost, c i -which may well be greater than his threshold b C i .
Proposition 1 demonstrates that fund-raising expenses may indeed deter donors from giving and render a fund-drive unsuccessful. Hence, when fund-raising entails signi…cant costs, a carefully planned strategy of who to ask for donations seems to be of utmost importance both to control the expenses and to encourage giving. 16 We illustrate this point with a numerical example, which also motivates our subsequent analysis. The following table reports donor equilibrium, and highlights the optimal fund-raiser set. 1 5 In the Appendix, Lemma A3 presents a weaker condition that allows for ci > b Ci. 1 6 Since the fundraising cost introduces a threshold to the public good provision, Proposition 1 is a reminiscent of the equilibrium characterization in Andreoni (1998) . Unlike his model, however, the provision point in ours will be endogenous to fundraising strategy as opposed to being a capital requirement.
Tables 1 reveals that it is optimal to contact only the donors 1 and 2. Donor 3 is not included in the set because of his high solicitation cost even though he would give the most.
It also reveals that with the optimal solicitations, the C=G ratio is 41%, which is not the lowest. Finally, it is clear that even with three donors, a direct approach to identifying the optimal fund-raiser set promises to be computationally demanding. In the next section, we make some key observations about the optimal fund-raising strategy and derive a simple algorithm to …nd it.
Optimal Fund-raising
Our …rst observation is that although donors may end up contributing nothing for an arbitrary fund-raiser set, the same cannot happen if the set is optimally chosen. Lemma 1. In a fund-raising equilibrium,
Lemma 1 says that in a world of complete information, an optimizing charity would never start fund-raising if it did not expect that donations would exceed the cost. Together with Proposition 1, this means that in our model, the charity can fail to provide the public good despite fund-raising only because it suboptimally sets the fund-raising strategy. 17 While enlightening, Lemma 1 does not inform us about the composition of individual contributions. As hinted by Example 1, the optimal fund-raiser set is likely to depend on this composition. The following result o¤ers some signi…cant insights in this direction. Proposition 2. If F o 6 = ?, then it is unique and exactly identi…ed by these two conditions:
Proposition 2 indicates that the charity will contact person i if he is expected to give more than his own cost in equilibrium. As such, the charity classi…es donors as net contributors and net free-riders with respect to their solicitation costs even though there is no explicit cost-sharing agreement among them. The equilibrium gifts exhibit some (implicit) cost-sharing due simply to the charity's decision of who to solicit. Note, however, that net contributors and net free-riders are de…ned in equilibrium. Thus, if the fund-drive is expected to be too costly, it is possible that donors give nothing, and in turn no fund-drive begins, F o = ?. 18 Proposition 2 essentially o¤ers an algorithm to determine the optimal set. Consider Table 1 above. We see that F o 6 = f1g because if included in this set, person 2 would also be a net contributor (4:83 4 > 0). F o 6 = f1; 2; 3g either; because person 3 would be a net free-rider (6:85 6:9 0). As a result, F o = f1; 2g.
Nevertheless, Proposition 2 is not a full characterization of the optimal strategy because it involves equilibrium choices. It does, however, point out that the optimal strategy should exactly identify the set of net contributors, or equivalently the set of net free-riders. A similar identi…cation problem would arise in the standard model if one were to detect the (pure) free-riders. For that case, Andreoni and McGuire (1993) o¤er an elegant algorithm that does not require equilibrium calculation for each subset of donors. Although our point of investigation here is very di¤erent from theirs, we draw a connection owing to Proposition 2.
When …nding the optimal set, it is clear from Proposition 2 that the fund-raiser can imagine each individual i tentatively paying for c i . Then, the optimal set problem reduces to "identifying the net free-riders" with residual incomes, w i c i , by using Andreoni and
McGuire algorithm. 19 Let G 0 i > 0 be the "drop-out" level of the public good for person i, which, given that 0 < f 0 i < 1 and f i (0) = 0, uniquely solves 20
One interpretation of G 0 i in our context is that person i becomes a net contributor if and only if the sum of others' net contributions stays below G 0 i . Without loss of generality, index individuals in a descending order of their dropout levels: 1 8 This is simply the subgame perfection argument. Some fundraising may never start because, given the cost, the fundraiser believes the donors would play the zero equilibrium. In fact, given our convention that g i (?) = 0, Proposition 2 is also consistent with F o = ?: C1 would trivially hold while C2 would imply that everyone would be a net free-rider, resulting in F o = ?. 1 9 Note that wi ci > 0 because ci < b
Ci by Assumption S. In general, any donor with wi ci 0 would automatically be excluded from the fundraiser set.
2 0 Technically, we need 0 < f 0 i < 1 (Andreoni 1988 ) to guarantee a solution here.
The following result fully characterizes the optimal fund-raising strategy.
::: n , with 1 > 0. Moreover, letting k 2 N be the largest number such that k > 0, the optimal fund-raiser set is F o = f1; :::; kg. This set generates the public good,
To understand how the optimal strategy works, note that i can be interpreted as a measure of person i's incentive to pay for his solicitation cost. In particular, as in Bergstrom
is the minimum level of total wealth needed to sustain public good G as an equilibrium among agents, 1; :::; i. This means that if the actual total wealth available to these agents is strictly less than i (G 0 i ), namely i > 0, then the dropout value of person i, G 0 i , cannot be reached, making him a net contributor and thus a candidate for the fund-raiser set. Given 0 i (G) > 0 by the strict normality, these incentives are monotonic in that i i+1 , and therefore, the fund-raiser considers the largest set of individuals with a positive incentive. This set will be optimal if, given the total fund-raising cost, P k j=1 c j , incurred, each individual decides to contribute rather than consume only the private good;
i.e., if, in equilibrium, his net cost, P k j=1 c j G i , is strictly less than his cuto¤, b C i . Since everyone else in the set is expected to give more than his solicitation cost, this net cost cannot exceed his own cost, which, by Assumption S, is less than his cuto¤, b C i . 21 As a point of reference, it is worth observing that if the charity could force each contacted donor to at least pay for his solicitation cost, then there would be no incentive constraint, k > 0, because no donor would be able to give less than his cost. This means that providing donors with the incentives to be net contributors is the reason why some in the population may not be solicited in our model.
The optimal fund-raising strategy in Proposition 3 is easy to apply given that it does not require any equilibrium computation. Moreover, it ends in at most n steps, which is often much smaller than the number of all donor subsets, 2 n 1. Re-consider Example 1 above. From eq. (2), it is easily veri…ed that G 0 1 = 7:71, G 0 2 = 6:0, and G 0 3 = 5:61. Using these, we …nd that 1 = 7:71, 2 = 2:01, and 3 = :17, which implies that F o = f1; 2g, as previously observed.
The optimal fund-raising strategy also has some intuitive comparative statics. Since eq. (2) implies that all else equal, G 0 i is higher (1) the richer the person; (2) the greater his demand for the public good; 22 and/or (3) the lower his solicitation cost, the fund-raiser is more likely to contact such a person. This is consistent with the anecdotal evidence that schools often exclusively solicit alumnus and parents; religious organizations …rst target their members; and health charities primarily ask former patients and their families for donations.
Proposition 3 also raises an interesting fund-raising question when donors'preferences and incomes are negatively correlated. Consider, for instance, two individuals, a and b, with Cobb-Douglas utilities, and let the solicitation cost be c for each. Then,
That is, while for small costs, the higher preference individual is more likely to be solicited than the richer one, the order switches for large costs. The reason is that the fund-raising cost has a direct income e¤ect, which is larger for the higher preference individual.
Unobservability of the Fund-raiser Set
While our assumption that the fund-raiser set is observable to donors is reasonable in some settings, in others, it may be less so. In particular, it may be di¢ cult or infeasible for donors to monitor the charity's solicitations, in which case they can only hold beliefs about them. Given the unique optimal set, F o , one natural belief system is as follows: if a donor in F o is contacted, he learns about the fund-drive and believes that the rest of F o will also be contacted, whereas, if a donor outside F o is contacted, he attributes this to a mistake and believes that he is the only one contacted besides F o . 23 Formally, letting F i be donor i's belief about the fund-raiser set when he is contacted, we have
and
Under these beliefs, the following result shows that the unobservability of the fund-raiser set is of no consequence in equilibrium.
Proposition 4. Suppose that the fund-raiser set is unobservable to donors. Then, under the beliefs, F i , described above, F o is sustained as a perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
The intuition behind Proposition 4 mainly comes from Proposition 2. When solicitations are unobservable, the fund-raiser would contact a donor outside the optimal set if he were expected to be a net contributor. But, this would contradict the fact that he was not included in the optimal set in the …rst place. Proposition 4 says that the fund-raiser does not necessarily have an incentive to "fool" donors about the solicitations, and run into a commitment problem about its targeting strategy.
Armed with the optimal fund-raiser behavior, we next address two policy-related issues, the …rst one being the role of an income redistribution. 
Income Redistribution and Non-neutrality
Then, we have c 1 c 2 ::: c n . Moreover,
That is, based on incomes, the charity determines a cuto¤ strategy for each individual, whereby individual i is solicited whenever the actual cost, c, falls below his cuto¤. In general, the cuto¤ is strictly less than one's income except for the richest agent, and the gap increases for lower income individuals. This is because the fund-raising strategy follows a pecking order: for a given c, the charity …rst asks the richest person(s) for donations, and once this person is in the "game", it becomes more conservative in asking the second richest person because of the free-rider problem, which is a function of the wealth di¤erence.
Applied iteratively, this logic explains why person i's cuto¤ in (3) is decreasing in the sum of wealth di¤erences between him and the others who are richer than him. One important implication of this observation is that a redistribution of income is likely to a¤ect the fundraising strategy and thus the equilibrium provision of the public good.
As …rst observed by Warr (1983) , if the set of contributors and their total wealth do not change by an income redistribution, then neither does the level of the public good in the standard model of giving. 24 This striking theoretical prediction has, however, been at odds with empirical evidence on private charity. 25 As such, several researchers have modi…ed the standard model to reconcile this discrepancy; but these modi…cations have mostly been con…ned to the donor side -the most prominent one being "warm-glow" giving in which people also receive a direct bene…t from contributing. 26 Here, we show that strategic and costly fund-raising can provide a complementary explanation as to the endemic breakdown of neutrality.
To develop some initial intuition, suppose again that individuals have identical CobbDouglas preferences:
G , and consider these two income distributions: w 0 = (w; w; :::; w) and w 00 = ("+n(w "); "; :::; "), with
It is readily veri…ed that in the standard model, all individuals contribute under both income distributions and thus in equilibrium, G 0 = G 00 > 0. This neutrality result should extend to costly fund-raising as long as c is small so that everyone is still contacted under both income distributions. For a su¢ ciently large c, however, the fund-raising strategy, and thus the public good provision, is likely to be a¤ected by the income distribution. For instance, when " < c < w, it is clear that whereas everyone is contacted under the egalitarian income distribution, w 0 , only the richest individual is contacted under the unequal income distribution, w 00 . This means that although there are more contributors under w 0 , there are also more fund-raising expenses. In fact, given Cobb-Douglas utilities, trivial algebra shows that equilibrium public good levels are given respectively by G 0 = n n(1 )+ (w c) and G 00 = (" + n(w ") c), and comparing them reveals G 0 < G 00 ; in particular
Note also that if the fund-raising were even costlier, w c < " + n(w "), then the fund-raising e¤ort would be reversed: no individual would be contacted under w 0 , 2 4 Subsequent work showed the robustness of this result with varying generality. See, e.g., Bergstrom et al. (1986) , Bernheim (1986) , Roberts (1987) , Andreoni (1988) , and Sandler and Posnett (1991), among others. 2 5 See, e.g., Clotfelter (1985) , Kingma (1989) , Steinberg (1991) , Brunner (1997) , and Ribar and Wilhelm (2002). 2 6 See, e.g., Cornes and Sandler (1984), Steinberg (1987) , and Andreoni (1989) .
whereas the richest person under w 00 would still be solicited. Nevertheless, the public good provision would again imply that 0 = G 0 < G 00 . Of course, if c " + n(w "), then no fund-raising takes place in either case.
Overall, it seems that when fund-raising cost is signi…cant, the neutrality result is unlikely to hold. In particular, even if, following an income redistribution, the poorest individuals remain willing to give, the fund-raiser may no longer solicit donations from them in order to control the costs. It also seems that while the equilibrium number of solicitations responds non-monotonically to a more unequal distribution of income, the public good provision will always increase. To prove these observations generally, we …rst need an appropriate de…nition of income inequality. To do so, we employ the well-known concept of Lorenz dominance (see, e.g., Atkinson 1970 , and Lambert 2001).
De…nition. (Lorenz Dominance) Let w = (w 1 ; w 2 ; :::; w n ) be a vector of incomes whose elements are indexed in a descending order, and de…ne L i (w) = P i j=1 w j . Consider two income vectors w 0 6 = w 00 such that L n (w 0 ) = L n (w 00 ). It is said that w 00 is more unequal than w 0 if w 0 Lorenz dominates w 00 , i.e., L i (w 00 ) > L i (w 0 ) for all i < n:
Intuitively, an income distribution w 00 is more unequal than w 0 if the total income is more concentrated in the hands of the few. In particular, the egalitarian income distribution Lorenz dominates all the others, whereas a perfectly unequal income distribution in which one person possesses all the wealth is dominated by all the others. Based on this inequality concept, we reach, Proposition 5. Let w 0 6 = w 00 be two income vectors such that w 00 is more unequal than w 0 in the sense of Lorenz. Moreover, suppose that with the standard model, every person is a contributor under both w 0 and w 00 so that
for c 2 [0; c 00 n ), and G 0 < G 00 for c 2 [c 00 n ; c 00 1 ). For c c 00 1 , no fund-raising takes place, yielding G 0 = G 00 = 0.
Proposition 5 generalizes our intuition from the above discussion. For a su¢ ciently small cost of fund-raising, every donor is solicited regardless of the income redistribution, resulting in the same level of the public good. When the cost is signi…cant, however, the fund-raising strategy, and the level of public good, is in ‡uenced by the income redistribution.
In particular, a more unequal income distribution produces a higher level of the public good.
Note from (3) that c 00 n is likely to be much smaller than w 00 n , whereas c 00 1 is equal to w 00 1 , which means that the cost interval [c 00 n ; c 00 1 ) can indeed be signi…cant. To illustrate Proposition 5 and the non-monotonicity of the fund-raising strategy, we present the following example. Example 2. Let N = f1; 2; :::; 10g and u i = x 1 i (G) , with = 0:3. Table 2 below records three income distributions, w 0 , w 00 , and w 000 . It is easy to verify that average income in each case is 19:27, and L i (w 0 ) > L i (w 00 ) > L i (w 000 ) for all i. Thus, w 0 and w 000 exhibit the least and the most inequality, respectively. Using (3), Table 2 reports the cuto¤ solicitation cost for each donor under these income distributions. Table 2 , note …rst that for a solicitation cost, c :29, all donors are called upon regardless of the income distribution, which implies the neutrality: G 0 = G 00 = G 000 , as it should. Second, for 1:75 < c < 1:91, the fund-raising set is non-monotonic in income inequality because clearly, F 0 = f1; 2; :::; 6g, F 00 = f1; 2; :::; 8g, and F 000 = f1; 2; 3g, revealing that F 000 F 0 F 00 . Nevertheless, the monotonicity in public good provision holds: G 0 < G 00 < G 000 , as predicted by Proposition 5. For instance, for c = 1:8, we have G 0 = 7:180, G 00 = 7:185, and G 000 = 7:220.
We should point out that strategic costly fund-raising o¤ers a complementary explanation for the non-neutrality to those identi…ed in the literature. In particular, as with Bergstrom et al. (1986) , we draw attention to the endogenous nature of the contributor set to the income distribution; but unlike in their study of the standard model, the contributor set in ours is optimally chosen by the fund-raiser. This means, for instance, that the non-contributors in our model are not necessarily pure free-riders; rather they are not asked for donations due to solicitation costs. We should also point out that in their Theorem 1d, Bergstrom et al. also observe that "Equalizing income redistributions that involve any transfers from contributors to non-contributors will decrease the equilibrium supply of the public good." 27 However, as is clear from Proposition 5, under strategic costly fund-raising, the non-neutrality exists even when everyone remains contributors under both income distributions in the standard model.
Government Grants
A long-standing policy question in public economics is that if the government gives a grant to a charity, to what degree will it displace private giving? While, in light of the neutrality result, the standard model of giving predicts a complete (dollar-for-dollar) crowding out, there is overwhelming evidence that this is not the case (see Footnote 25) . The empirical studies have, for the most part, attributed any crowding-out to the donors' responses.
Recently however, Andreoni and Payne (2003, 2011) have shifted attention and empirically
showed that a signi…cant part of the crowding-out can be explained by the fund-raiser's response in the form of reduced fund-raising e¤orts. By a simple modi…cation to our base model, we can theoretically address the same issue here and support their …ndings. 28 Let R > 0 be the amount of the government grant, and F o R and F o 0 denote the optimal fund-raiser sets with and without the grant, respectively. The following result summarizes our …ndings in this section. Proposition 6. Suppose that, without a grant, some public good is provided, i.e., G 0 > 0. (b) each donor gives strictly less with the grant, i.e.,
Since a government grant directly enters into public good production, part (a) implies that the charity optimally responds by soliciting fewer donors. This reduced fund-raising is not because the charity has diminishing returns to funds under a linear production, but because it anticipates that donors will be less willing to give, as re ‡ected by the optimal strategy. While, all else equal, cutting back fund-raising increases the public good provision by cutting costs, it also leaves some donations unrealized. Moreover, despite a smaller fund-raiser set, and thus less severe free-riding, with the grant, part (b) indicates that each contacted donor gives strictly less than he would without the grant. This is due to diminishing marginal utility from the grant that simply overwhelms the small group e¤ect.
Part (c) shows that the two negative e¤ects of a government grant, namely lower fund-raising and fewer donations, never neutralize its direct production e¤ect on the public good. That is, the crowding-out is partial because of both the fund-raiser's and the donors'behavioral responses.
Two observations are in order. First, unlike income redistribution, a government grant monotonically reduces the optimal fund-raiser set. The reason is that through the public good, R uniformly a¤ects all the donors. Second, Proposition 6 appears consistent with anecdotal evidence that in economic downturns, fund-raising e¤orts often increase. For instance, in the wake of the recent economic crisis, state legislatures across the U.S. cut back support for higher education, and in response, public colleges and universities are reported to have stepped up their fund-raising by hiring consultants, hunting down graduates, and mobilizing student phone banks (New York Times 2011, Jan. 15).
Large Replica Economies
Many charities have access to a large donor base. In particular, the advent of information technology has helped fund-raisers to better search and locate prospect donors. To understand fund-raising behavior in large economies, we consider a simple replica-economy in which there are r donors of each type represented by the triple (u i ; w i ; c i ), resulting in the drop-out value G 0 i from (2) . The following result is the main …nding in this section. Proposition 7 says that except for the most willing type, there is a large enough replication of the economy in which no other type is solicited. The reason is that as the economy is replicated, the higher types replace the lower ones in net contributions. Proposition 7 also says that in the limit, each donation from a type-1 person converges to his respective solicitation cost. While this means that the net contribution is approximately zero, the level of the public good approaches to a …nite level G 0 1 . Note that even in the limit, it is not the lowest cost and/or highest income donors who are solicited; rather it is a combination of all the three attributes that determine the highest type.
Within the standard model, Andreoni (1988) …nds that, all else equal, in large economies, only the richest agents contribute and others free ride. Andreoni also …nds that the average contribution decreases to zero. 29 With costly fund-raising, our result suggests that only the richest agents contribute because they will be the only ones to be solicited in large economies. Moreover, the average donation converges to the solicitation cost, which is strictly positive.
Conclusion
It is an unfortunate fact that charities need to spend money to raise money. Thus, a careful planning of who to ask for donations should be paramount for a charity aiming to control its fund-raising costs while maximizing donations. Perhaps, this is why the charitable sector has grown to be highly professional and innovative. Yet, the theory of charitable fund-raising has almost exclusively focused on its revenue side. In this paper, we take a …rst stab at …lling this void by introducing an active fund-raiser to the standard model of voluntary giving as studied by Bergstrom et al. (1986) . In particular, we assume that each donor becomes aware of the fund-drive only if solicited by the charity, which is costly to do. In this extended model, we fully characterize the optimal fund-raising strategy that can be easily computed from the donors'preferences and incomes, and the fund-raiser's solicitation costs. Using this characterization, we show that costly fund-raising can provide a novel explanation for the non-neutrality of income redistributions and crowding-out hypothesis often encountered in empirical studies. We also show that in large replica economies, it is only the most willing types who are solicited for donations -not because others would free-ride per se but because they would not be cost e¤ective to ask for donations. In addition, the average donation converges to the solicitation cost, which is strictly positive.
Our analysis is based on the standard model in which donors have purely altruistic motives of giving. This model allows us to clearly highlight the e¤ects of fund-raising costs, and it is the framework most theoretical insights for public good provision are built on. Before making …rm policy recommendations, however, other motives of giving such as "warm-glow" (Andreoni 1989 ) should also be taken into account. Nonetheless, we believe that the basic trade-o¤s identi…ed in our investigation would continue to emerge in these enriched settings. For future research, it may also be worthwhile to consider the possibility of sequential solicitations where donations are collected upon each visit. Another promising, and perhaps more challenging, direction would be to investigate the competition between charities where donors'responses are fully accounted for.
A Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. Fix an arbitrary fund-raiser set, F 6 = ?, whose total fund-raising cost is C(F ) > 0. Suppose that C(F ) < max i2F b C i , but, on the contrary, that G (F ) = 0.
Then, it must be that g i (F ) = 0 for all i 2 F (otherwise, any g i (F ) > 0 would be used by person i toward the private good). Since C(F ) < b C j for some j 2 F , note that given G j (F ) = 0, person j would strictly prefer to contribute, yielding a contradiction. Thus,
pro…le is an equilibrium, resulting in G (F ) = 0.
Proof of Lemma 1. Clearly, G (F o ) > 0 implies that some agents have been contacted, and thus F o 6 = ?. Conversely, suppose that in equilibrium,
, the charity has a strict incentive to choose F = ? and incur no cost. Hence,
In what follows, we de…ne the contributor set,
Arranging terms yields P
If, on the other hand, F 6 = F C , then we have i (G (F )) G (F ) = w i g i (F ) for i 2 F C , and i (G (F )) G (F ) w i for i 2 F nF C . Then, summing over all i 2 F , we obtain,
. Proof of Proposition 2. Let F o be the unique optimal fund-raiser set. Suppose that
Note that the equilibrium public good must
We …rst prove that
, where the equality follows from Lemma A1. Then,
where the last equality follows from Lemma A2. Since 0 
Inserting this into the equilibrium condition,
where the last equality follows because, by the …rst part of the proof,
, which contradicts the optimality of
, or decomposing terms,
C; i and thus a free-rider in the set F + ), it follows that
Note again that
, contradicting the optimality of F o . As a result, i is in F o , which means F o also satis…es C2.
((=): We prove the uniqueness of the equilibrium fund-raiser set. Suppose, on the contrary, that there are two distinct sets F and F 0 each satisfying C1 and C2. Note that F F 0 or F 0 F cannot be the case: otherwise, C1 or C2 would be violated for at least one set. Next, take any i such that i 2 F 0 but i = 2 F . By C2, i would be a net free rider in
, where G 0 i is given by eq.(2). Therefore,
where the …rst inequality follows from the strict normality: 0 < f 0 i < 1, and the second one by de…nition of equilibrium. Note also that G (F + ) G (F ) by the same argument we made in the …rst part above: removing a net free rider weakly increases the equilibrium public good. Therefore,
In addition, since i is a net contributor in F 0 by C1, it follows that
Proof of Proposition 3. We …rst claim that if G (F ) > 0 for some F , then i 2 F is a net contributor in equilibrium, i.e., g i (F ) c i > 0 if and only if
, and
Given that G 0
. If this is an equilibrium, each i = 1; :::; k is a net contributor because G 0 i > G . G is an equilibrium among these individuals if
But, by Assumption S,
Lemma A3. Let k 2 N be the largest number such that k > 0 as in Proposition 3.
Then, if the following condition holds:
:::; k. Moreover, Assumption S implies (A-1).
Proof. By de…nition,
Moreover, in any equilibrium person i gives less than his stand-alone contribution at the cuto¤ cost:
Inserting and simplifying terms, b 
:::; k, the inequality again follows. Finally, if Assumption S is satis…ed, i.e., c i < b C i for i 2 N , we have
Proof of Proposition 4. We will show that given the beliefs fF i g
is not a pro…table deviation for the fund-raiser. In particular, letting g o j be j's contribution in this case, we will show that g o j c j . To the contrary, suppose g o j > c j . Then, upon being contacted, person j would expect others'gross contributions to be G (F o ), resulting in
On the other hand, if the individuals in F o knew about the presence of j before contributing, then, by Proposition 2, we would have:
This is because F o is optimal and j = 2 F o . Furthermore,
Note that g j (F o +j ) c j and c j < g o j imply that g j (F o +j ) < g o j , which in turn implies that Simplifying terms, c i solves,
But, this solution is valid only if it is nonnegative; otherwise the cuto¤ cost is set to 0 to mean that person i never contacted for a positive cost, as in eq.(3).
To prove the last part, note from (2) that 
which implies that G 0 < G
00
. Next, suppose that F 00 C F 0 C 6 = N , and by way of contradic-
where the third line follows from the fact that individuals fm 00 + 1; :::; m 0 g are net freeriders under w 00 . This implies that L m 0 (w 0 ) L m 0 (w 00 ), which contradicts our hypothesis that w 0 Lorenz dominates w 00 . Thus, G 0 < G 00 .
Finally, consider which implies that L m 0 (w 0 ) > L m 0 (w 00 ), contradicting Lorenz dominance hypothesis. Hence,
Proof of Proposition 5. From (3), L i (w 00 ) > L i (w 0 ) for every i < n implies c 00 n < c 0 n and c 00 1 > c 0 1 . Note also that c 00 n > 0 since she is a contributor for c = 0: Hence, for c 2 [0; c 00 n ) all individuals are contributors, F 00 C = F 000 C and L n (w 00 ) = L n (w 0 ). Therefore, G 0 = G 00 . For c 2 [c 00 n ; c 00 1 ), we clearly have that one of the conditions in Lemma A4 is satis…ed, and the fact that G 0 < G 00 follows directly from Lemma A4.
Proof of Proposition 6. To prove part (a), note that since G (F o R ) = max F fG(F ) C(F ) + R; 0g, in equilibrium G (F o R ) C(F o R ) 0; otherwise F o R = ?, which guarantees the public good level R. That is, even with an outside grant R, the fund-raiser tries to maximize G(F ) C(F ) in equilibrium. In particular, Proposition 2 still holds. Since
). This has two implications: First, as in Lemma A1, summing over all i 2 F o R , we obtain -4) implies that for i > 1, i (r) is strictly decreasing in r, whereas 1 (r) = G 0 1 , which is independent of r.
To prove part (a), observe that since 1 (r) = G 0 1 > 0 for any r, type-1 donors are always solicited. Consider i > 1. Note that i (1) 0 implies that i (r) 0 for any r 1. If, on the other hand, i (1) > 0, then there exists r i < 1 such that i (r i ) 0 . This means i (r) < 0 for r r i . Moreover, given that i (r) > i+1 (r), it follows that r i+1 r i for i > 1. Thus, type i donors are not solicited in a replica economy with r r i for i > 1.
To prove part (b), note that as r ! 1, only type-1 will be asked for donations by part (a). Note also that given the symmetry within the limiting group, the equilibrium must be symmetric. Since G 0 1 > 0, it follows that G > 0 and G < G 0 1 ; otherwise G G 0 1 would imply no contribution, yielding a contradiction. The symmetric equilibrium means that each type-1 donor is a net contributor, which means that G is monotonically converging to G 0 1 . Since G 0 1 is a …nite level, we must have g 1 ! c 1 ; otherwise, if, in the limit, g 1 c 1 > 0, then G ! 1, making everyone contribute nothing, a contradiction.
